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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARJORIE ALLISEN, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Case No, 880031 
v. : 
AMERICAN LEGION POST NO. 134, 
(District Court 
Defendant/Appellant. : Case No. 38 319) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT MARJORIE ALLISEN 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal was granted by Order of this Court on 
March 1, 1988, pursuant to Rule 5 of the Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
A. Did the old Utah Dram Shop Act apply to 
providers of beer as well as other alcoholic drinks? 
B. Would interpreting the old Utah Dram Shop Act 
to not apply to providers of beer lead to absurd and incon-
gruous results? 
C. Would interpreting the old Utah Dram Shop Act 
to not apply to providers of beer be within the intent of 
the Utah Legislature? 
D. Should the court recognize an action for negli-
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gence on the part of a provider of beer who negligently 
serves beer to an already intoxicated person? 
STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
The statutes, rules or cases in support of 
Respondent's position are as follows: 
STATUTES: 
Utah Code Annotated Section 32-1-3 
Utah Code Annotated Section 32-7-14 
Utah Code Annotated Section 32-11-1 
Utah Code Annotated Section 32A-14-1 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Respondent was severely injured when she was struck 
by an automobile operated by a Mr. Wesley Harju. Mr. Harju 
was a member of the American Legion Post in Clearfield, 
Utah. Prior to the accident, he consumed at least six 
glasses of beer at this American Legion Post. Mr. Harju 
weighs approximately 115 pounds. The accident occurred when 
Mr. Harju turned onto SR-126 in front of the Legion Post and 
collided with the Respondent who was walking in the area at 
the time. 
Subsequently, the Respondent filed suit against the 
American Legion Post under our Utah Dram Shop Act. 
Appellant moved for summary judgment on the basis that Mr. 
Harju was served "light beer" prior to the accident. 
Appellant contended that light beer was not "liquor" within 
the meaning of the Utah Dram Shop Act effective at the time 
of the accident. The trial court denied this motion. (See 
-2-
attached order of the court.) Subsequently, the trial court 
granted motions for summary judgment brought by Clearfield 
City, Utah Power and Light Company and the State of Utah. 
All of these parties were brought into this lawsuit as third 
party defendants by Appellant American Legion Post 134. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Legislature intended for the 1981 Dram 
Shop Act to apply to providers of beer as well as vodka, 
whiskey, gin and other strong drinks. This is because the 
object of the Dram Shop Act was to force providers of alco-
holic beverages to share a portion of the large cost to 
society that results from the misconduct of intoxicated 
individuals. Since one can become drunk by drinking beer or 
by drinking whiskey, the Dram Shop Act must sensibly apply 
in both instances. 
The discrepancy in language between the Liquor 
Regulatory Act and the Dram Shop Act can be accounted for by 
the fact that the laws were enacted twelve years apart. 
Also, it can be explained because the two acts have funda-
mentally differing purposes. One act regulates liquor 
sales. The other creates a private cause of action against 
providers of alcoholic beverages. Definitions from one 
should not automatically be applied to the other. 
The Utah Legislature has clarified the meaning of 
the old Dram Shop Act by amending it to include providers of 
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beer. This should make it clear that it always was the 
intent of the legislature to include providers of beer 
within the statute. The fact that they were not included 
was an oversight not a design. 
Public policy considerations mandate that the old 
Dram Shop Act be applied to providers of beer. Otherwise, 
an absurd result will follow. In other words, a provider of 
beer, certainly the largest quantity alcoholic beverage con-
sumed in this state, will escape liability for causing an 
intoxication while a provider of whiskey would not. Laws 
should not be interpreted to lead to absurd results. 
Finally, the court should allow Respondent to main-
tain an action against the American Legion Post for common 
law negligence if it holds that the old Dram Shop Act does 
not apply here. Such a result would be in harmony with Utah 
statutory law and common sense, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE: THE UTAH DRAM SHOP ACT IN EFFECT AT THE 
TIME OF THE ACCIDENT CONTAINED THE 
PHRASE "LIQUOR" WHICH WAS MEANT TO 
INCLUDE BEER. 
Appellant's contention that this lawsuit cannot 
proceed because beer is not liquor as defined in the old 
Utah Dram Shop Act is one which is without merit and must be 
rejected. 
The first argument which is made is that the "plain 
meaning" of liquor simply does not encompass beer. This 
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point is not well taken. It is common knowledge that liquor 
is regulated because it has the propensity to make people 
intoxicated. Intoxicated individuals are more lacking in 
judgment than non-intoxicated individuals. Intoxication 
causes individuals to act in a careless, negligent and reck-
less manner. This can cause unnecessary, severe and even 
fatal injuries to innocent third parties. Drunk or intoxi-
cated motorists cause thousands of deaths every year on our 
nation's highways. They cause billions of dollars in direct 
and indirect costs to society. In an effort to see that a 
small portion of the losses to innocent victims can be 
compensated, the legislature enacted the Dram Shop Act. 
Obviously, the legislature intended to penalize 
establishments who serve intoxicated customers alcohol. It 
also intended to penalize establishments who served minors 
alcohol when these establishments cause an intoxication 
which results in injury to a third person when damages are 
assessed. The whole idea of the Dram Shop Act was to force 
manufacturers and retailers of intoxicating beverages to 
share some of the exorbitant cost to society imposed by 
drunks causing accidents. 
Therefore, in light of the purpose of the Dram Shop 
Act, the plain meaning of liquor must be held to include 
beer. This is because beer can cause an intoxication just 
as bourbon, vodka, scotch, gin or rum can. 
-5-
The legislative history of the Dram Shop Act makes 
it equally clear that the legislature intended to allow Dram 
Shop suits against beer retailers as well as those of other 
alcoholic beverages. In order to understand the true intent 
of the legislature though, it is necessary to undertake an 
analysis of all Utah liquor regulatory legislation. Young 
v. Barney, 433 P.2d 846 (Utah, 1966). 
In 1969, the Utah Legislature adopted a comprehen-
sive regulatory code for selling and serving liquor and 
alcoholic beverages. The code set forth provisions for 
operating liquor stores, private clubs and restaurants. 
Contained in this 1969 law is a section which defines 
liquor. Beer is excluded from this definition. [U.C.A. 32-1-3] 
In 1981, in response to national trends, the Utah 
Legislature passed the first Dram Shop Act. This statute 
stated that: 
(1) Any person who gives, sells, or 
otherwise provides intoxicating liquor to 
another contrary to subsection 16-6-13.1 
(8)(d), subsection 32-1-36.5 (1)(1), sec-
tion 32-7-14 or subsection 32-7-24 (b) or 
(c), and thereby causes the intoxication 
of the other person, is liable for inju-
ries in person, property, or means of 
support to any third person, or the 
spouse, child or parent of that third 
person, resulting from the intoxication. 
(2) A person who suffers an injury 
referred to in subsection (1) of this 
section, shall have a cause of action 
against the intoxicated person and the 
person who provided the intoxicating 
liquor in violation of subsection (1) 
above, or either of them. 
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(3) If a person having rights or lia-
bilities under this section dies, the 
rights or liabilities provided by this 
section shall survive to or against that 
person!s estate. 
[U.C.A. 32-11-1, emphasis added.] 
Appellant contends that the definition of liquor in 
U.C.A. 32-1 through U.C.A. 32-7 enacted around 1969 must 
control the definition of liquor in U.C.A. 32-22-1 which was 
enacted in 1981. Respondent submits that the definition 
from this entirely different scheme of regulation must not 
be automatically lifted from the code and applied to the 
Dram Shop Act. First, there is no legislative history which 
would indicate it was the intent of the 1981 legislature to 
apply the same definition of "liquor" which appeared in ear-
lier legislation. Second, there was a gap of twelve years 
from the passage of the earlier legislation until the pas-
sage of the Dram Shop Act. Third, the Dram Shop Act is fun-
damentally different legislation than the other liquor 
measures enacted in 1969. The 1969 legislation pertained 
to licensing of liquor sales establishments and administra-
tive regulation of such sales. Dram Shop's legislation has 
a fundamentally different character. It creates a private 
right to sue on the part of innocent third parties who are 
injured by intoxicated individuals. It does not enlarge or 
change the power of the Utah Liquor Commission as was the 
intent of the 1969 legislation. Therefore, the same set of 
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definitions should not automatically be applied to both 
statutes. 
The subsequent legislative history of the Dram Shop 
Act is even more crucial than the prior history. In 1986, 
the Utah Legislature amended the 19 81 Dram Shop Act to 
include all "alcoholic beverages". (U.C.A. 32 A-14-1) This 
new statute states: 
(1) Any person who directly gives, 
sells, or otherwise provides liquor, or 
at a location allowing consumption on the 
premises, any alcoholic beverage to a 
person: 
(a) Who is under the age of 21 
years or, 
(b) Who is apparently under the 
influence of intoxicating alcoholic 
beverages or products or drugs or, 
'(c) Whom the person furnishing 
the alcoholic beverage knew or should 
have known from the circumstances was 
under the influence of intoxicating alco-
holic beverages or products or drugs or, 
(d) Who is a known interdicted 
person, 
and by those actions causes the intoxica-
tion of that person, is liable for inju-
ries in person, property, or means of 
support to any third person, or to the 
spouse, child, or parent of that third 
person, resulting from the intoxication. 
An employer is liable for the actions of 
its employees in violation of this 
chapter. 
(2) A person who suffers an injury 
under Subsection (1) has a cause of 
action against the person who provided 
the liquor or other alcoholic beverage in 
violation of Subsection (1). [Emphasis 
added] 
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Appellant contends that the new Dram Shop Act was 
enacted because the old act did not cover beer. Respondent 
submits that this was not the case at all. Rather, the 
statute was enacted to clarify an ambiguity in the old law. 
In other words, the legislature changed the law so that eve-
ryone would clearly understand that the act was meant to 
apply to beer as well as other intoxicating beverages. The 
law was changed for purposes of clarity rather than 
substance. 
In considering the meaning that the Utah Legislature 
intended the old Dram Shop Act to have it is important to 
understand a principle of statutory construction. This 
principle is that reason and intention may prevail over 
technically applied literalness. Andrus v. Allred, 404 P.2d 
972 (Utah, 1965). 
Public policy considerations are extremely impor-
tant in this case. If the court accepts Appellant's inter-
pretation of the 1981 Dram Shop Act it will lead to an 
absurd result. Bars which serve beer are immune from a Dram 
Shop suit while private clubs which serve bourbon, vodka or 
gin will not be immune. The court will fail to have focused 
on the most important thing: the fact that someone was made 
intoxicated. The court should consider the principle of 
statutory construction which says that statutes should not 
be construed to lead to unintended and incongruous results. 
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Snyder v. Clune, 390 P.2d 915 (Utah, 1964). Curtis v. 
Harman Eletronics, 575 P.2d 1044 (Utah, 1978) [Statutes 
are presumed not to be intended to produce absurd conse-
quences and will be construed so that they do not]. Barton 
v. Carson, 380 P.2d 926 (Utah, 1963) [Statutes should be 
accorded reasonable and logical meanings], 
POINT TWO: EVEN IF THE COURT HOLDS THAT THE OLD 
DRAM SHOP LAW DOES NOT PERMIT AN 
ACTION FOR INTOXICATION CAUSED BY 
BEER, IT MUST ALLOW THIS ACTION TO 
PROCEED ON A COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE 
THEORY. 
Even if this court should hold that the old Dram 
Shop Act does not apply to beer, then Respondent's case 
cannot be dismissed. Rather, Respondent should be allowed 
to maintain this lawsuit against American Legion Post 134 on 
the basis of a common law negligence theory. 
The record in this case established that Mr. Wesley • 
Harju consumed six beers at the American Legion Post prior 
to the accident. At the time of the accident, Utah had a 
statute in effect which made it unlawful to serve an 
intoxicated individual alcoholic beverages. U.C.A. 32-7-14 
stated that: 
No person shall sell or supply any 
alcoholic beverages or permit alcoholic 
beverages to be sold or supplied to any 
person under or apparently under the 
influence of liquor. 
The central idea of negligence law is that if one 
violates a duty and as a proximate result of that violation 
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injures another, he is liable for damages. Duties can be 
created by statute or by common law. Respondent contends 
that U.C.A. 32-7-14 creates a duty to not serve intoxicated 
persons alcoholic beverages. Any breach of this duty should 
be considered negligence. If injuries proximately result 
from this negligence, a jury should be allowed to award the 
injured party damages. 
Even if the court believes this statute creates no 
duty, this court should recognize a duty through a common 
law analysis. In United States v. Carroll Towing Company, 
159 F.2d 169 (CA2, 1947) the court states the now classic 
formula for determining whether an activity constituted 
negligence. Judge Learned Hand indicated that a duty 
exists depending upon (1) the probability of injury, (2) the 
gravity of the potential injury, and (3) the burden of tak-
ing precautions. In the case at bar, the probability that 
an intoxicated patron of the Legion could harm someone was 
considerable. The gravity of a potential injury was high 
(particularly if we include motor vehicle accidents). 
Finally, the burden of taking precautions was not high. Bar-
tenders need simply to be instructed to not serve more than 
two or three beers to each customer as a maximum. 
Under any analysis the court must recognize a legal 
duty on the part of the American Legion Post to not serve 
beer to intoxicated patrons. The breach of this duty must 
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be held to actionable as negligence. 
CONCLUSION 
The idea that one who serves an intoxicated patron 
beer instead of whiskey should be immune from lawsuit under 
the Dram Shop Act is absurd. The legislature did not intend 
such a result. Rather, the discrepancy in statutory lan-
guage exists because: 
1. There was a twelve year gap between the passage 
of the Liquor Regulatory Act and the first Dram Shop Act; 
2. The Dram Shop Act has a fundamentally different 
nature than the Liquor Regulatory Act. Therefore, the leg-
islature did not intend definitions from the regulatory law 
to be lifted and automatically applied to the Dram Shop Act. 
It must also be noted that the legislature has 
acted and now changed the language "liquor" to "alcoholic 
beverages". This should be interpreted as clarifying the 
meaning of the earlier law rather than changing it. 
Clearly, the old Dram Shop Act was intended to cover servers 
of beer as well as whiskey, vodka and other strong drinks. 
Even if the court interprets the old Dram Shop Act 
to exclude servers of light beer, Respondent must be permit-
ted to proceed with this case* Respondent can proceed on a 
theory of negligence. Such a theory can be based on U.C.A. 
32-7-14 or upon the common sense idea that it is dangerous 
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to serve alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated individual. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this Pcrx day of June, 1988. 
JAMES R. HASENYAGER .', 
Attorney for Respondent 
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STATE OF UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, et al., 
Third-Party Defendants. 
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